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JURISDICTION 
The order that is the subject of this appeal is a 
final order and judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42 the Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals 
for disposition. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in granting Dayna' s 
motion for a "directed verdict" at the conclusion of Searles's 
case? 
Because this case was tried to the bench and not to a 
jury, Dayna' s motion is more properly identified as a motion for 
involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P. When a 
trial court has granted involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) 
made findings and entered judgment thereon, it is the appellate 
court' s duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the findings. Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co. , 3 Utah 2d 
247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955); Child v. Havward. 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 
P. 2d 758 (1965); Petty v. Gindv Mfg. Corn. . 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 
P. 2d 30 (1965); Petrie v. General Contracting Co. , 17 Utah 2d 
408, 413 P. 2d 600 (1966). The trial court's findings of fact 
will be reversed only if clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law 
are reviewed for correctness. Southern Title Guarantee Co. v. 
Bethers, 761 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Searles' 
motion to amend the pleadings to allow parol evidence to vary 
the terms of Searles' written contract of employment? 
A motion to amend the pleadings falls within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P. 2d 1189 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Westlev v. Farmer' s Insurance Exchange. 663 P. 2d 
93 (Utah 1983). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform 
to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that 
it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings 
to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such 
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The 
court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to 
meet such evidence. 
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Rule II (] •) I II .; a ill: I ! i :i ] • =M i < ::>:f: C . i i 3 I J :• : i : eduz "«i • 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
• For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
"to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal 
an action or of any claim against him. 
After the plaintiff in an actin tried by * ae 
court without a j ury , has completed the 
presentation of his evidence the defendant, 
without waiving his right to offer evidence 
in the event the motion i s not granted, may 
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon 
the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as 
trier of the facts may then determine them 
and render judgment against the plaintiff or 
may decline to render any judgment until the 
close of all the evidence. If the court 
renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shal 1 make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
subdivision in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue 
-r for lack of an indispensable party, 
..i^ ai-^ c .o . •-. ^ ^-inHication upon the me 
Rule 52(a) k ; j*vr-- i .v. a 'rocedure. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an, advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A ; i n 
granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact, and conclusions 
of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Find 
of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence., shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
•:• • , tri al court to judge the credibility of the 
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witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It 
will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close f 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 5 9 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of a one-year written 
employment contract between Plaintiff/Appellant William J. 
Searles ("Searles") and Defendant/Appellee Dayna Communications, 
Inc. ("Dayna"). Searles was employed as an area director of 
sales at Dayna from October 1, 1988 through January 27, 1989 
under a written contract that had a one-year term. (R. 3 3 5; Tr. 
Ex. P-2, attached hereto as Appendix A) 
The contract contains specific termination provisions 
including termination "for cause" for Searles' material breach 
of his obligations under the contract or for failure of Searles 
"to perform the duties assigned to [him] in an acceptable 
manner." (Tr. Ex. P-2) The contract contains specific 
responsibilities of Searles as an area director of sales, 
including "[t]o fulfill the Quota requirements established 
pursuant to this Agreement." (Tr. Ex. P-2) The quota 
-4-
r e q u i r e m e n t s a re s e t: :)ii 1 t ::i n 
S e a r l e s ' q u o t a f o r t h e f i r s t q u a r t e . u i r:e l*ot? : i s : a - ; e a . was 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . (Tr Ex, P • 2) 
Sea i J c= .s « 3 :i c:i I C t: r i e € I : l: i = • ; =1 ] <= s j i i o t a I!:' :: •. t .he lia i. " =; t: 
quarter of the 1 98 9 fiscal year. (R. 32 3) Dayna terminated 
Searl^- employment on January 27, 11989, paid his comm--^ n.? ons 
I I n " II III I II I I I II i i 1 i l nil ll I L k l J ) l J I "i I 1.1 1 1 '"'I I i i i 'I .. '•"" ci 1 i;l J, )' I 
February hi, 198 9 (,R, 3 62) 
Searles filed suit against Dayna alleging two causes 
I d o t . i in III"' I  in ii» l i r a t , a u M I- J d e l J i in M , i i i M j i i l t" inpensator xj 
damages for breach of contract for termination contrary to ' "-;e 
terms of t;,hp contract The second sought punitive damages lor 
b i ear i ; ' ] I.I I a mi i iii|j I, ,i e i i c o v o M d i i l ad' " IU '.I t a i Uh a n d f a . . .*._.,. ncr 
(R 2 - 8 ) 
Searles called two witnesses at: tri a 1 , Keith Bradf• :i)i:d 
Romne y
 jr J r. , executive vice p re s i d e nt c • f D a y na, a nd S e a r 1 e s, 
After Searles has presented all evidence ;:-ut: before formally 
r e s t * * *"" \ . - I-fi . i me lid Mint- 111 --ip \ in | I M 
confw-... . ..- ,.,11-.. t., . »-;yested that the express terms of 
the vL.**er. -mpi -v*ne.v Mtract were subject to conditions 
precedent ' - mot m on, 
. ..iuu4, t i -^ci.-y, Dayna moved for a "directed 
verdict " The ttial court granted Dayna' s motion fi nding that 
Sea rJ e 1 ( au I i fi I n H S I <ihl I rali an par i ma f a c d 3 :::;a s a Tin in I 
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explained its findings to the parties (R. 395-9) and entered a 
"Statement of Grounds for Directed Verdict, " (R. 191-3) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court' s Decision to Grant Davna' s Motion for 
Involuntary Dismissal Was Not Clearly Erroneous. 
A. Dayna' s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Was 
Inadvertently Mislabeled as a Motion for a 
"Directed Verdict." 
At the conclusion of Searles' case, Dayna moved for 
and was granted a "directed verdict." Because the case was 
tried to the bench and not to a jury, the motion was actually a 
motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b). On appeal, 
the motion should be reviewed as a motion for involuntary 
dismissal. 
B. Involuntary Dismissal of Searles' Case Was 
Appropriate Because Searles Failed to Show any 
Right to Relief. 
The trial court granted Dayna' s motion because Searles 
had failed to establish a prima facie case. Even if Searles had 
presented a prima facie case, the dismissal was appropriate 
because Searles failed to carry his burden of persuasion showing 
his right to relief. 
C. The Dismissal of Searles' Case Is Well-Supported 
by Decisions Under the Parallel Federal Rule. 
Decisions under the parallel Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure demonstrate that the dismissal of Searles' case after 
his presentation of the evidence was proper. 
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II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in 
Denying Searles' Motion to Amend the Pleadings to 
Conform to the Evidence. 
?! t: the concJ usi on of h i s i)resentation o f 1:he ovi dence 
11 in I. Ije ! i, 11: i •" f o r ma ] ] j i: es t:::i :i:i j hi s c as <i 11 if! d i, ,1 u s in 11 * p e d I <, i \ nif-« i in 1 L h e 
pleadings to conform to the evidence, 
A. Searles Failed to Present Anv Admissible Evid ence 
that the Written Agreement Was Subject to 
Conditions Precedent. 
Throughout his presentation of the evidenee , Sear1es 
attempted to introduce parol evidence that would contradict or 
vary the expres s terms of his wri 11en agreement wi th Dayna. 
After timely objections by Dayna, Searles agreed to offer the 
evidence • on ] i as foi unci a t: :l on for the ; iri tten aqiveni^nt am o 
T,ar; L:*. S. , A \ igreement. Thus, no evidence "w as admi tted 
ar ' :\e ' .. :r. : le agreement and the denial of the motion 
Searles Has Failed to Present Any Evidence That Shows 
His Entitlement to Relief. 
A The Law of the Case Doctrine Is Inapplicable in 
the Present Case. 
Searles has attempted to introduce a transcript of an 
oral rulii ng by another judge i n another case as evidence of his 
e lit :i t J e int «= iit t: <:::: :i : e J :ii e f :i ii !:  h e p r e s e n t • ::: a s e Th e t: r a n s c i:i p t h a s 
no precedential value i n the present case and should be 
disregarded for purposes of this appeal. 
-7-
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court' s Decision to Grant Davna' s Motion for 
Involuntary Dismissal Was Not Clearly Erroneous. 
A. Dayna' s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal Was 
Inadvertently Mislabeled as a Motion for 
"Directed Verdict. " 
At the conclusion of Searles' case, Dayna moved for a 
"directed verdict" in its favor. The court granted the motion, 
finding that Searles failed to present a prima facie case. 
Because the case was tried to the court and not to a jury, the 
motion was more properly a motion for involuntary dismissal 
under Rule 41(b). Although mislabeled by the parties and by the 
trial court, the grant of Dayna' s motion was proper and well-
supported. 
Inadvertent mislabeling of motions under Rule 41(b) 
has been common. l Parties in non-jury cases have often 
mistakenly moved for a directed verdict, or parties in jury 
1
 Under the parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
provision in federal Rule 41(b) that provided for dismissal for 
failure to show a right to relief in a non-jury action was 
deleted in 1991 and has been replaced by new Rule 52(c). 5 
James W. Moore & Jeremy C. Wicker, Moore' s Federal Practice 
11 41. 13 (2d ed. 1992). Federal Rule 52(c) now authorizes entry 
of judgment against the defendant as well as the plaintiff, and 
earlier than the close of the case of the party against whom 
judgment is rendered. A motion to dismiss under Rule 41 on the 
ground that a plaintiff s evidence is legally insufficient 
should now be treated as a motion for judgment on partial 
findings as provided in Rule 52(c). Committee Note of 1991 to 
Amended Rule 41(b). 
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cases have erroneously sought an involuntary dismissal. L The 
cases have universally held that a mislabeled motion should be 
treated as though it had been properly made and judged under the 
appropriate standards. 5A James W. Moore & Jeremy C. Wicker, 
Moore7 s Federal Practice 1f 50.03[1] (2d ed. 1992). See, e. a. . 
International Union. United Auto. Aerospace & Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America. UAW v. Mack Trucks. 917 F. 2d 107 
(3d Cir. 1990); Kotzen v. Levine. 678 F. 2d 140 (11th Cir. 1982); 
McCorstin v. United States. 621 F. 2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980). 
B. Involuntary Dismissal of Searles' Case Was 
Appropriate Because Searles Failed to Show any 
Right to Relief. 
Rule 41(b) governs involuntary dismissals and in 
pertinent part provides as follows: 
After the plaintiff in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed the 
presentation of his evidence the defendant, 
without waiving his right to offer evidence 
in the event the motion is not granted, may 
move for a dismissal on the ground that upon 
the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court as 
trier of the facts may then determine them 
and render judgment against the plaintiff or 
may decline to render any judgment until the 
close of all the evidence. If the court 
renders judgment on the merits against the 
2
 The Advisory Committee Note to the 1991 amendments to 
Rule 50, Fed. R. Civ. P. , indicates that such labeling errors 
are "merely formal." Professor Moore anticipates that such 
labeling errors will proliferate under the 1991 revisions to the 
Rules because of changes in terminology made by the Rules. 5A 
James W. Moore & Jeremy C. Wicker, Moore' s Federal Practice 
1f 50. 03[1] (2d ed. 1992). 
-9-
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
The above-cited rule is substantially identical to 
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the 
1991 revisions to the Federal Rules. The Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that Federal interpretations of Federal Rule 41(b) 
are applicable to Utah Rule 41(b). See Wilson v. Lambert, 613 
P. 2d 765, 767 n. 2 (Utah 1980); Wineaar v. Slim Olson, Inc. , 122 
Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205, 207 (1953). 
The purpose of Rule 41(b) is to permit a defendant to 
move for judgment in his favor when the trial court, even before 
hearing the defendant' s evidence, determines that the plaintiff 
has failed to offer persuasive evidence regarding the necessary 
elements of his case. Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc. , 813 
F. 2d 296, 299 (10th Cir. ), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987). 
In the present case, the trial court considered all of the 
evidence offered by Searles and concluded that Searles had 
failed to prove his case against Dayna. 
First, the trial court found no evidence that Dayna 
violated any provision of the written contract, reasoning as 
follows: 
Count 1, the literal contract claim. 
There' s been a failure to produce any 
evidence that the defendant violated any 
terms and conditions of the contract in 
terminating the [plaintiff]. [Plaintiff], 
according to the evidence, construed in a 
-10-
light most favorable for the plaintiff, was 
terminated for cause. Cause is defined by 
the contract, not by any moral 
considerations or anything like that. Cause 
in this particular contract is established, 
in part, by failure to meet quotas. 
The evidence unequivocally indicates 
that the [plaintiff] concedes that the 
quotas were not met. Therefore, the 
contract provision on cause could be 
invoked, it was invoked, and the termination 
was had, and the termination does not 
constitute a violation of the contract. 
(R. 396) Thus, the trial court found no evidence that Dayna's 
termination of Searles' employment contract violated any 
contract right. 
Second, the trial court considered Searles' claim that 
Dayna had acted in bad faith and had violated the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in every contract. 
The court reasoned as follows: 
As to the second count, good faith and 
fair dealing, there is no evidence before 
the Court that there was any unfair dealing 
or that there was any bad faith by the 
defendant. The evidence does not establish 
any requirement of the defendant. The 
evidence does not establish any requirement 
of the defendant to provide product, per se. 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
however, would prohibit the defendant from 
failing to provide product in bad faith. 
There is no evidence to suggest that there 
was bad faith in doing so. 
(R. 396-7) The trial court found absolutely no evidence that 
Dayna had acted other than in good faith and attributed the lack 
of available product to "inaccurate projections." (R. 397) 
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While every contract includes an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, that implied covenant will not 
alter the terms of the contract. Where explicit rights are 
specified in a contract, any different or contrary implied 
rights are precluded. lf[A]n express agreement or covenant 
relating to a specific contract right, excludes the possibility 
of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature. " 
Ted R. Brown & Assoc. , Inc. v. Carnes Corp. , 753 P. 2d 964, 970 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 
P. 2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980)). Thus, Searles could not rely on any 
implied terms to limit or contradict Dayna' s rights as defined 
in the contract. 
The trial court' s reasons for granting Dayna' s motion 
were stated in significant detail on the record. (See R. 396-9) 
The court subsequently entered its formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in its "Statement of Grounds for Directed 
Verdict." (R. 191-3, attached hereto as Appendix B) When a 
trial court has made findings and entered judgment thereon, it 
is the appellate court' s duty to review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the findings, which must be allowed to 
stand if reasonable minds could agree with them. Lawrence v. 
Bamberger Railroad Co. . 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P. 2d 335 (1955); 
Child v. Havward. 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 P. 2d 758 (1965); Petty v. 
Gindy Mfg. Corp. . 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 30 (1965); Petrie v. 
General Contracting Co. , 17 Utah 2d 408, 413 P. 2d 600 (1966). 
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The findings of the trial court were well stated and supported 
by the evidence at trial. 
Searles argues that this Court should review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to him. (Searles' Brief 
p. 15) Searles argues that the standard of review set forth in 
Davis v. Payne & Dav, Inc. , 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P. 2d 337 (I960), 
should be applied because the trial court failed to make finding 
of fact as provided in Rule 52(a). As discussed above, however, 
the trial court did enter findings of fact both orally on the 
record and again in a formal document. The standard of review 
used by the Davis court, however, is applicable only where no 
findings have been entered by the trial court. 
Involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate 
either when the trial judge finds that the claimant has failed 
to make out a prima facie case or when the trial judge is not 
persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant. Lemon v. 
Coates, 735 P. 2d 58 (Utah 1987); Southern Title Guarantee Co. v. 
Bethers. 761 P. 2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The trial judge 
found that Searles had failed to make out a prima facie case. 
Even if Searles had presented a technically correct prima facie 
case, however, the trial judge clearly found the evidence 
unpersuasive. 
Involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is not limited 
to cases where the plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie 
case but is appropriate whenever the plaintiff fails to carry 
-13-
his burden of persuasion. The Utah Supreme Court has explained 
the application of the Rule as follows: 
When a court sitting without a jury has 
heard all of plaintiff s evidence, it is 
appropriate that the court shall then 
determine whether or not the plaintiff has 
convincingly shown a right to relief. It is 
not reasonable to require a judge, on motion 
to dismiss under Rule 41(b), to determine 
merely whether there is a prima facie case, 
such as in a jury trial should go to the 
jury, when there is no jury--to determine 
merely whether there is a prima facie case, 
sufficient for the consideration of a trier 
of the facts when he is himself the trier of 
the facts. To apply the jury trial practice 
to non-jury proceedings would be to erect a 
requirement compelling a defendant to put on 
his case and the court to spend the time and 
incur the public expense of hearing it if 
the plaintiff had, according to jury trial 
concepts, made "a case for the jury," even 
though the judge had concluded that on the 
whole of the plaintiff s evidence the 
plaintiff ought not to prevail. A plaintiff 
who has had full opportunity to put on his 
own case and has failed to convince the 
judge, as trier of the facts, of a right to 
relief, has no legal right under the due 
process clause of the Constitution, to hear 
the defendants' case, or to compel the court 
to hear it, merely because the plaintiff s 
case is a prima facie one in the jury trial 
sense of the term. 
Johnson v. Bell. 666 P. 2d 308, 311 (Utah 1983) (quoting Wineaar 
v. Slim Olson. Inc. . 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205, 207 (1953)) 
(emphasis in original). 
The record is clear that Dayna had grounds to 
terminate Searles' employment under the express terms of the 
contract. (Tr. Ex. 2, attached hereto as Appendix A) The 
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employment contract between the parties governs their 
relationship. "The beginning point of interpretation of a 
contract is an examination of the language used therein in 
accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of the words. " 
Puah v. Stockdale & Co. , 570 P. 2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1977). 
Paragraph 7D of the contract between Dayna and Searles 
provides that Searles shall have the responsibility "[t]o 
fulfill the Quota requirements established pursuant to this 
Agreement. " Paragraph 6 sets the quota for Searles for the 
first quarter of the 1989 fiscal year at $1,000,000. Searles 
did not fulfill that quota obligation. 
Paragraph 10 of the contract provides in pertinent 
part; 
This Agreement shall terminate prior to the 
end of its Term . . . (iii) "for cause" 
which shall include, but not be limited to . 
. . any material breach of [Searles] 
obligations, covenants, agreements or 
warranties hereunder, or a failure by 
[Searles] to perform the duties assigned to 
[him] in an acceptable manner. 
Searles testified that he did not meet his sales quota 
for fiscal 1988 or for fiscal 1989. (R. 336-7). Dayna, 
therefore, had grounds to terminate Searles "for cause" under 
the explicit terms of the agreement between the parties. 
Pursuant to Rule 41(b), the trial court sitting as 
finder of the facts is entitled at the end of plaintiff s 
presentation of evidence to weigh that evidence, and if it is 
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found to be unbelievable or insufficient in some regard, to make 
a ruling on the merits of the evidence and dismiss the 
complaint. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P. 2d 308, 311 (Utah 1983); 
Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P. 2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The trial court did, in fact, allow Searles to present 
his case, weighed that evidence and found the evidence 
insufficient to support a claim against Dayna. 
In ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal under 
Rule 41(b), the "court does not make any special inferences in 
the plaintiff's favor, instead, [the] court must examine and 
weigh all of the evidence. " Henderson. 731 F. Supp. at 1378 
(citing Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp. . 724 F. 2d 563, 568 (7th 
Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). In the present 
case, however, the trial court considered the evidence in a 
light most favorable to Searles and still found the evidence 
insufficient. (R. 396) 
C. The Dismissal of Searles7 Case Is Well-Supported 
by Decisions Under the Parallel Federal Rule. 
The involuntary dismissal of Searles' case against 
Dayna is well-supported by similar cases decided in the Federal 
courts under the parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
Dance v. Ripley, 776 F. 2d 370 (1st Cir. 1985), the plaintiff, a 
black woman brought an action under Title VII against the head 
of the agency for which she worked claiming that she had been 
discriminated against because of her race. The plaintiff was 
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the only witness called for her case. After her testimony, the 
plaintiff rested. The defendant then moved for dismissal under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), arguing that plaintiff had failed to 
establish a prima facie case, or, in the alternative, that 
plaintiff s case had been rebutted by evidence that defendant' s 
actions were legitimate and nondiscriminatory. 
The district court granted the motion to dismiss, 
issuing very brief findings of fact and conclusions of law under 
Rule 52(a) that plaintiff had not presented a case that she was 
rejected by reason of unlawful discrimination. 
The plaintiff appealed, contending that the dismissal 
was based on a finding that she had not presented a prima facie 
case, and that she had presented a case. The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed finding that, although the district 
court' s findings could have been clearer, it did not appear from 
them that the district court simply rejected plaintiff's prima 
facie case, but rather that the court had weighed plaintiff s 
case against uncontested evidence of a nondiscriminatory motive, 
and had found defendant' s rebuttal decisive. The court 
concluded that, once the plaintiff had rested her case, a Rule 
41(b) dismissal was appropriate. 
In the present case, the trial court reviewed the 
evidence presented by Searles in support of his case and found 
that evidence insufficient. Although the trial court' s findings 
could have been more detailed, the findings clearly support the 
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court' s ruling. The findings are more than adequate to allow 
this Court to review the basis for the trial court' s rulings. 
The application of Rule 41(b) is well supported by-
other authority. See, e. a. . Sepulveda v. Pacific Maritime 
Ass' n. 878 F. 2d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. ), cert, denied. 110 S. Ct. 
561 (1989) (an action tried to the court may be dismissed 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) when the district court considers the 
evidence presented and finds that the plaintiff has failed to 
establish a prima facie case); Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum. 
Inc. . 813 F. 2d 296 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 954 
(1987) (involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) was proper where 
plaintiffs had not proven the necessary elements of their case); 
Allres v. Amoco Production Co. , 774 F. 2d 409 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(district court had not abused its discretion in granting motion 
to dismiss under Rule 41(b)); Henderson v. United Parcel 
Service. Inc. . 731 F. Supp. 1374 (S. D. Ind. 1990) (plaintiff 
failed to set forth direct evidence of discrimination in a Title 
VII action or establish a prima facie case that he was 
discriminated against on the basis of race). 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in 
Denying Searles' Motion to Amend the Pleadings to 
Conform to the Evidence. 
At the conclusion of Searles' presentation of the 
evidence but before formally resting, Searles made a motion to 
amend the pleading to conform to the evidence. Searles claimed 
that the evidence had raised a question as to whether the 
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contract was a complete integration and suggested that there 
were conditions precedent to Dayna' s ability to terminate 
Searles for failure to reach his sales quota. The court denied 
the motion finding the contract to be "clear and unambiguous." 
(R. 385). A motion to amend the pleadings falls within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion. Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. 746 
P. 2d 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Westlev v. Farmer' s Insurance 
Exchange. 663 P. 2d 93 (Utah 1983). 
A. Searles Failed to Present Anv Admissible Evidence 
that the Written Agreement Was Subject to 
Conditions Precedent. 
Amendment of the pleadings to conform to evidence 
presented at trial is governed by Rule 15(b) which in pertinent 
part provides as follows: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform 
to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time . . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (emphasis supplied). Amendment of the 
pleadings to allege the existence of a condition precedent to 
enforcement of the contract by Dayna was inappropriate because 
Dayna did not expressly or impliedly consent to the trial of the 
issue. 
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In his own brief, Searles admits that "[t]hroughout 
the trial and during presentation of Searle' s [sic] case, Dayna 
objected to the Court considering any evidence that might be 
used to contradict or vary the terms of the written agreement 
between the parties." (Searles7 Brief p. 18) Time and time 
again, Searles attempted to offer evidence that might vary the 
express terms of the written contract between Searles and Dayna. 
Counsel for Dayna consistently objected to the introduction of 
any evidence that would contradict or vary the terms of the 
agreement. Counsel for Searles insisted that the evidence was 
not offered to vary the terms of the agreement but only as 
foundation and as evidence of whether or not Dayna acted in good 
faith. The trial court admitted the evidence only for this 
limited purpose. (See, e. g. , R. 35, 318-20, 338-9) After 
numerous objections from counsel for Dayna, and numerous 
assurances from counsel for Searles that the evidence was not 
being offered to vary the terms of the written agreement, the 
following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: Let me tell you, I think 
a more fair way to proceed here is since you 
represent the plaintiff, the plaintiff has a 
burden of proof, the plaintiff collects its 
claims and throws out other alternative 
claims, that if at any time you' re offering 
a piece of evidence to vary the terms of the 
agreement, then you need to tell us. How is 
that? Then we don' t have to worry about 
adding these objections. Is that a fair way 
to proceed? 
-20-
MR. PERKINS: Yes. I'll go with that. 
MS. LEITH: I think that would be 
very helpful. Thank you, your Honor. 
(R. 339) Searles did not identify or offer any evidence to vary 
the terms of the agreement. At the conclusion of his 
presentation of the evidence, Searles attempted to circumvent 
Dayna' s objections and the court's rulings by moving to amend 
the pleadings to conform to the evidence. Because the evidence 
was never offered to vary the terms of the agreement, the issue 
was never tried and amendment under Rule 15(a) was 
i nappropri ate. 
Searles cites Stanaer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co. , 
669 P. 2d 1201 (Utah 1983) for the proposition that where a 
written contract is not the complete contract, parol evidence 
may be admitted. The Stanaer court explained the doctrine of 
partial integration as follows: 
The doctrine of partial integration is that 
where a written contract is obviously not, 
or is shown not to be, the complete 
contract, parol evidence not inconsistent 
with the writing is admissible to show what 
the entire contract really was, by 
supplementing, as distinguished from 
contradicting, the writing. In such a case 
parol evidence to prove the part not reduced 
to writing is admissible, although it is not 
admissible as to the part reduced to 
writing. 
Stanaer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co. . 669 P. 2d 1201 (Utah 
1983) (emphasis added). Thus, parol evidence may only be 
admitted under the partial integration doctrine if the evidence 
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is "not inconsistent with the writing." The doctrine is clearly 
inapplicable where, as in the present case, a party attempts to 
introduce parol evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a 
written agreement. 
Searles had a full and fair opportunity to allege the 
terms and conditions of his agreement with Dayna. Searles 
failed to present any evidence for the purpose of contradicting 
or varying the terms of the written agreement. Finding the 
written agreement to be an integrated document, the trial court 
refused to admit contradictory parol evidence or to allow the 
pleadings to be amended to conform to this inadmissible 
evidence. The decision of the trial court to deny Searles7 
motion to amend was not an abuse of the court' s discretion. 
III. Searles Has Failed to Present Anv Evidence That Shows 
His Entitlement to Relief. 
In his "Statement of Issues on Appeal" contained in 
his brief, Searles appears to argue that the Court of Appeals 
should make and enter its own findings and award judgment in his 
favor. (Searles Brief p. 7) This argument is completely without 
support in the body of the brief and is contrary to the 
appropriate standards of review identified above. Searles has, 
however, attempted to introduce evidence of a ruling in another 
case to establish the "law of the case" in the present action. 
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A. The Law of the Case Doctrine Is Inapplicable in 
the Present Case. 
Searles makes the astounding claim that an unpublished 
decision in another case with different facts and different 
parties, tried to a different judge, somehow establishes the 
"law of the case" in the present case. Searles acknowledges 
that unpublished orders may not be cited as authority. 
(Searles' Brief p.25) Searles' argument appears to be nothing 
more than an attempt to circumvent the Court' s prohibition on 
the citation of unpublished authority. 
The law of the case doctrine has no application where 
two different cases are involved. That doctrine was recently 
explained by this Court: 
The purpose of the law of the case 
doctrine is "to avoid the delays and 
difficulties that arise when one judge is 
presented with an issue identical to one 
which has already been passed upon by a 
coordinate judge in the same case." Sittner 
v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil. Inc. . 692 P. 2d 
735, 736 (Utah 1984). Ordinarily, a judge 
cannot overrule the decision of another 
judge of the same court. Richardson v. 
Grand Cent. Corp. . 572 P. 2d 395, 397 (Utah 
1977). However, "the ruling of one judge as 
to the sufficiency or effect of pleadings, 
does not prevent another division of the 
court from considering the same question of 
law if it is properly involved on a 
subsequent motion which presents the case in 
a different light. " Id. 
DeBrv v. Valley Mortgage Co. , 835 P. 2d 1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the law of the case doctrine has nothing to do 
with the present case. Searles' has presented a transcript of 
an oral ruling by another judge, in another case, on different 
facts, tried after the Searles case was decided. The 
unpublished transcript, therefore, has absolutely no 
precedential value and should be disregarded by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Searles has failed to carry his burden of establishing 
that the trial court erred in any of its rulings or that the 
case should be remanded for further proceedings. Accordingly, 
Dayna respectfully urges this Court to AFFIRM the judgment of 
the trial court. 
DATED this &f day of November, 1992. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Jor^E. Waddoups 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellee to be 
^ mailed, postage prepaid, this ^7 ' day of November, 1992, to 
the following: 
D. Kendall Perkins 
124 South 600 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
20309 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Patricia M. Leith, Bar No. 1932 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. SEARLES, ) 
) STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR 
) DIRECTED VERDICT 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 900902787CN 
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation, ) Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. ) 
The Court, having granted the motion of defendant 
Dayna Communications, Inc. for a directed verdict against the 
plaintiff William J. Searles at the close of the plaintiff s 
case, issues this brief written statement of the grounds for its 
decision as required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION — BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The Court finds that Searles has failed to produce 
evidence that Dayna violated the terms of the written contract 
between the parties. "Cause" for termination is defined by the 
contract. "Cause" for termination was established here by 
Searles7 failure to meet sales quotas established by the 
contract. Therefore, Dayna' s termination of the contract for 
g \wol\048\0QO012a8 W51-090991 \\ I I \ \$ \ 
O C T <J 1991 
Searles' failure to meet his sales quotas was not a violation of 
the contract. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION -- BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
The Court finds that there is no evidence of unfair 
dealing or bad faith on the part of the defendant Dayna 
Communications, Inc. The evidence does not establish an 
obligation on the part of Dayna to provide new products. There 
is evidence to suggest that any failure on the part of Dayna to 
meet its projections was natural to the industry. 
Prognostications, perhaps particularly in the microcomputer 
industry, are not always met. 
Searles agreed in the written employment contract to 
meet the sales quotas. He did not meet them, perhaps through no 
fault of his own. A different situation would be presented if 
the quotas were set after the contract was executed. 
This case centers on basic notions of contract law. 
Without construing the intent of the parties, it may be that the 
provision for termination for failure to meet contract 
responsibilities, which include meeting quotas, was included 
because the industry tends to overestimate the market capacity 
or the ability of research and development to place new products 
on the market. In any event, it was part of the agreement of 
the parties. 
Under the circumstances, Searles' remedy is not an 
action for breach of contract or breach of good faith and fair 
-2-
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dealing. His remedy is not to enter into a contract to produce 
at a certain level unless he is satisfied that the products are 
available and he is satisfied with other conditions he believes 
are necessary for him to perform. 
There is no evidence that this contract was immoral or 
illegal or otherwise unenforceable. 
An employment contract is not an unconditional 
guarantee of continued employment; the employee is entitled to 
continued employment under the contract only if he or she meets 
the responsibilities agreed on in the contract. 
DATED this V ^  day of September-, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
h>~u^U / , /L~y 
Approved as to form: 
Honorable Michael R. Flurprny 
Judge, Third J u d i c i a l Di / s t r ic t 
D. Kendall Perkins 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Patricia M. Leith, Bar No. 1932 
Attorneys for Defendant <*> 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM J. SEARLES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900902787CN 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
The Court, having granted defendant' s motion for a 
directed verdict at the end of plaintiff s case, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
defendant Dayna Communications, Inc. is awarded judgment against 
the plaintiff for no cause of action. 
, / * -
MADE AND ENTERED this Y day of September, 1991. 
£t^A_ 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COURT: 
Z1 
Honorable Michael R. 'Murphy 
Judge, Third Judicial District 
D. Kendall Perkins 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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AREA DIRECTOR AGREEMENT 
THIS AREA DIRECTOR AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") made and entered into 
on the date set out below, by and between WILLIAM SEARLES ("AD") and DAYNA 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("Dayna"), each of whom acknowledges and agrees to 
abide by these covenants. 
RECITALS 
1- Dayna desires to secure the services of AD to promote sales of Dayna 
Products, pursuant to the terms and conditions herein contained. 
2- AD desires to enter into this Agreement in order to receive compensation for 
efforts to be expended by AD pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions 
herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, intending to be legally 
bound, do hereby agree as follows: 
1- Term. 
The term of this Agreement shall begin on October 1,1988 and shall continue to 
September 30, 1989, subject to prior termination as hereinafter provided. It is the 
intention of the parties that this Agreement shall be reviewed, and a new and similar 
Agreement shall be entered into to cover Dayna's fiscal year 1990, based on performance 
under this Agreement. 
2- Salary. 
The salary to be paid to AD by Dayna shall be Forty-four Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($44,000) computed on an annual basis, payable on a biweekly basis, pursuant to 
Dayna's usual and customary payroll practices, and subject to termination as hereinafter 
provided. 
3- Commission and Incentive Bonus. 
The Override to be paid to AD for net dollars revenue to Dayna from the 
assigned Territory (see Paragraph 5, Territory) in the first six months of the Term of the 
Agreement shall be one percent (1%) of all net dollars to Dayna as a result of sales to all 
Buyers other than Disributors. Revenue dollars from sales to Distributors in the first six 
months of the Term of the Agreement shall earn Override of six-tenths of one percent 
(0.6%). The Override to be paid to AD in the second six months of the Term of the 
Agreement for all Buyers other than Distributors shall be eight-tenths of one percent 
(0.8%). Revenue dollars from sales to Distributors shall continue to earn Override of six-
tenths of one percent (0.6%). Commission and Override on all Major National Store 
Chains shall be paid at the rate of seventy-five percent (75%) to the Area into which the 
goods are shipped, twenty-five percent (25%) to the Area handling the Corporate offices. 
A- Neither Commission nor Override shall be paid on service revenues, 
spare parts or accessories ordered from Customer Support, or on 
component pans of any Dayna product that may be ordered as a 
result of negotiations conducted by persons employed by Dayna 
other than the AD or Agents under his control. 
B- The Commission and Override shall be paid on net dollars received 
by Dayna. In the event substantial or extraordinary discounts are 
offered in order to obtain a specific contract, the Commission or 
Override rate, if any, may be negotiated by Dayna's Vice President 
of Sales, or other authorized Dayna officer. 
D- Incentive Commission shall be paid for performance in excess of 
Quota (see Paragraph 6, Quota).In the first six months of the Term 
of the Agreement, Quota shall have been met when the Quota for 
First Six Months has been shipped and invoiced by the 
Company.Incentive Commissions shall be paid on all dollars in 
excess of Quota that have been shipped and invoiced during that six 
month period. In the second six months of the Term of the 
Agreement, Quota shall have been met when the Annual Quota has 
been shipped and invoiced by the Company, and Incentive 
Commission shall be paid on all dollars in excess of that Quota that 
have been shipped and invoiced during the Fiscal Year. Incentive 
Commission shall consist of two times the Commission Rate. 
F- In order to earn the Override the AD or agents under his control 
must obtain a purchase order against which product may be properly 
shipped and invoiced, and the customer must honor the invoice with 
payment. UNTIL THE PAYMENT IS COMPLETE, THE 
COMMISSION HAS NOT BEEN EARNED. 
Notwithstanding this fact, Dayna may elect to pay the Commission 
in anticipation of payment being completed. In that event, should 
payment not be completed, the AD may be charged back an amount 
equal to the Commission paid. 
G- The Commission shall be paid on the last paycheck of each month, 
for the previous monthly period, (i.e., April's Commission paid on 
last paycheck of May). 
4- Expenses. 
Dayna shall reimburse AD for the reasonable amount of hotel, traveling, 
entertainment and other expenses wholly, exclusively, and necessarily incurred by AD in 
the discharge of AD's duties hereunder, in accordance with the normal practice for such 
reimbursements by Dayna to its other employees. AD shall submit to Dayna 
substantiation of the expenses incurred, as reflected in a credit card statement or other 
documentation, together with a record of (1) the amount of the expenditure, (2) the time, 
place and nature of the expenditure, (3) the business reason for the expenditure and 
expected benefit, (4) the names, positions and other information concerning individuals 
entertained sufficient to establish their business relationship to Dayna, and (5) any and all 
other information specifically required by Dayna, from time to time. The foregoing 
information shall submitted in such form as Dayna may, from time to time, determine. 
Reimbursement of expenses shall be contingent upon the approval of Dayna's Vice 
President of Sales, or other authorized Davna officer. 
5- Territory. 
The AD shall have as his Area of Management the States West of the 
Mississippi River, and the States of Alaska and Hawaii, except for the States of 
Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. 
The foregoing Territory assignment shall be subject to change at Dayna's 
sole discretion. 
6- Quota. 
The Quota assigned to AD shall be as set forth below for the Term 
of this Agreement: 
Quarter 1, Fiscal 1989 $ 1,000,000 
Quarter 2, Fiscal 1989 $1,400.000 
First Six Months Quota $2,400,000 
Quarter 3, Fiscal 1989 $2,600,000 
Quarter 4, Fiscal 1989 $3.800.000 
Annual Quota Fiscal 1989 $8,800,000 
The Quota is to be derived from the assigned Area. 
7- Responsibilities of Area Director. 
The AD shall have the following responsibilities: 
A- To obtain, or direct agents under his control to obtain, orders for 
Dayna Products which can be shipped and invoiced with complete expectation that the 
customer will honor the invoice with payment at prices specified in Dayna's published 
pricing schedules, or pursuant to specific contracts with such customer. 
B- To represent Dayna, its products, personnel and business in a 
manner which Dayna shall prescribe as appropriate for its sales personnel. 
C- To refrain from making any misleading, inaccurate or other 
improper statement, or from giving such indication to any third party relative to Dayna's 
business, products or relationships. 
D- To fulfill the Quota requirements established pursuant to this 
Agreement. 
8- Time Devoted by Area Director. 
AD agrees to devote his or her full business time, attention, efforts and 
abilities exclusively to the business of Dayna and to use his or her utmost endeavors to 
promote the interests of Dayna. 
9- Chargebacks. 
In the event of payment of the Commission in advance of receipt by Dayna 
of all monies from the customers on orders covered by such payment, or in the event a 
draw against Commission is outstanding, a "chargeback" in the amount of the 
Commission shall be paid to Dayna by AD should the employment of AD be terminated. 
10- Termination. 
This Agreement shall terminate automatically at the end of its Term. This 
Agreement shall terminate prior to the end of its Term (i) at the death of AD, or (ii) at 
Dayna's option and upon the giving of ninety (90) days' written notice of termination to 
AD, or (iii) "for cause" which shall include, but not be limited to, conviction of a felony, 
dishonesty, breach of confidentiality, any material breach of AD's obligations, 
covenants, agreements or warranties hereunder, or a failure by AD to perform the duties 
assigned to AD in an acceptable manner. If employment is terminated pursuant to this 
paragraph, all compensation shall cease and no additional amounts will be payable to AD 
by Dayna, or to AD's heirs, executors, administrators or legal representatives, other than 
that portion of any Commission which was earned by AD, pursuant to the terms hereof, 
prior to such termination, net of any chargeback. 
11- Entire Agreement. 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties pertaining to the 
subject matter hereof. This Agreement shall be subject to, and construed in accordance 
with, the laws of the State of Utah. This Agreement shall supercede any and all prior 
agreements between the parties. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this 
, 1988. 
. day of 
AREA DIRECTOR 
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
,#/-v 
Barnes F. Waltz 
VICE PRESIDENT, SALES 
W. SEARLES 
EXHIBIT "B" 
THIS EXHIBIT DESCRIBES CERTAIN ACCOUNTS assigned the 
District Sales Manager or the Area Sales Manager. These accounts are the 
Territory of the designated Field Sales Representative. The support of 
these accounts does remain the duty of the Dealer Support Sales Rep 
responsible for the geographical territory. 
CERTAIN SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS ARE EXCEPTED from the 
Territories of all Field Sales Representatives. These accounts are: 
Apple Computer Cupertino, CA and all 
ordering offices, 
world-wide. 
PRC (FAA contract only) Washington, DC area 
Apple Third Party Developers Domestic U.S. 
TERRITORIAL ACCOUNTS 
EDS Technical Products 
Resource Dynamics 
Alphagraphics 
Big Three Industries 
Diamond Shamrock Corporation 
E-Systems, Inc. 
Fleming Companies 
Lomas and Nettleton Financial Corp 
NASA Space Center 
TXSchlumberger, Ltd. 
Shell Oil Company 
Alpha-Beta 
University of Utah 
{t&^t&wf /%wf 
Richardson, TX 
Dallas, TX 
Tucson, AZ 
Houston, TX 
Dallas, TX 
Dallas, TX 
Oklahoma City, OK 
Dallas, TX 
Houston, 
Dallas, TX 
Houston, TXScaggs 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Salt Lake City, UT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. SEARLES, ] 
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vs. ] Case No. 900902787CN 
DAYNA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,] | ' ,
 s s> 
a Utah corporation, ] ^ " VwV''v/ 
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For 
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MS. LEITH: 
objection tc 
objection. That is 
purposes of varying 
THE COURT: 
I misspoke 
Exhibit 3. 
that 
the 
Do 
it shou 
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when 
I do 
Id not 
Exhib 
you intend to 
I said I 
have 
be < 
it 2 
use 
the 
did 
same 
admitted 
that . for 
not 
for 
purposes of varying Exhibit 2? 
MR. PERKINS: Same purpose as we have stated 
with regard to Exhibit 1, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Which includes the proposition 
neither 1 nor 3 are intended for the purpose of varying 
the terms of Exhibit 2? 
MR. PERKINS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. 1 and 3 are then 
received for the limited purposes indicated, and the 
objection to any further use is sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Perkins) Now, with regard to the other 
products, Mr. Romney, we talked about Dayna Net and its 
projections, Dayna Talk had a couple of varieties; is 
that correct, there was a PC version and Mac version? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tests projected that these products, too, 
would come on line and be able to be sold and develop 
additional revenues for the company? 
A. Correct. 
Q. They too were delayed, weren't they? 
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which we were operating sales of the company proposed for 
fiscal 1989. 
Q. And that included how the company was going to 
achieve the quota goals that had been or were being set? 
A. Yes. A number of the pages here refer to the 
sales quotas by area, by sales person, and so on. 
Q. And do you recall if Mr. Searles participated 
in the preparation of this plan? 
A. I don't know what involvement Bill had in the 
preparation of the plan. It was prepared and modified on 
various occasions by Jim Walls. I believe he would claim 
to be the author of the document from beginning to end. 
Q. Do you recall if this plan was adopted by the 
company to set forth the sales plan it would pursue? 
A. Well, in effect, it was adopted. I'm not sure 
we ever had any kind of a formal adoption by the company 
of the sales pl^n, okay? We agreed that we were going to 
try to make this plan happen and took steps in that 
direction. 
Q. So it wouldn't require the board to adopt it, 
but management would decide this looks like a reasonable 
thing to do, so let's do it? 
A. Correct. 
MR. PERKINS: I move for the admission of 7-P. 
MS. LEITH: I would object to the admission for 
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any purpose other than to go to the issue of good faith. 
THE COURT: Do you have any other purposes for 
offering it? 
MR, PERKINS: Well, we have been talking very 
narrowly about the issue of good faith, your Honor. I 
think there's also — there are also issues that have 
related to good faith but that are involving implied 
conditions to the employment contract. I believe that it 
can be shown that the company, by implication, said that 
"We're going to provide additional personnel, promotional 
money, money to hire new people, and we're going to have 
product ready to be sold and delivered to enable the 
sales force to be able to meet the quota goals." 
THE COURT: But does that relate to anything 
that's an attempt to vary the express terms of the 
contract? 
MR. PERKINS: I don't think it varies the term. 
It, again, goes to good faith by implying these things 
would be done to enable the sales force to meet quota 
and, if not done, it goes to whether or not the 
termination clause of the employment agreement was 
exercised in good faith or not. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll take that to mean 
it's not being offered to vary the term of the contract, 
and with that limitation in mind — what is it, 7? 
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MR. PERKINS: Yes. 
THE COURT: 7 is received. 
MS. LEITH: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Perkins) I'll direct your attention to 
the third page of that document, which is an 
organizational chart dated 9-30-88 in the left-hand upper 
corner, and on the right side under Jim Walls, it shows 
Western Area Sales Director, W. Searles, and it has four 
locations, Los Angeles, San Jose, Dallas and Seattle. 
Everywhere but the San Jose entry it shows sales open 
fiscal year '89. 
Now, does that entry mean that it's proposed to 
add a sales employee under Mr. Searles in that location? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so at that time there was only P. Sun. 
That was someone who was an existing employee? 
A. Yes, Pam Sun. 
Q. Now, were these other three locations — or did 
these other three locations ever receive a sales 
representative as projected? 
A. Los Angeles did. I don't believe we ever hired 
anybody in Dallas or Seattle. May I note that Seattle 
doesn't call for a sales person. It calls for a support 
person. 
Q. What's the difference between sales and 
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A. Yes. 
Q. The quota is a percentage mark that if the 
sales director meets that quota, he then gets commission 
of twice the usual rate? 
A. I think the effect of it — and, by the way, it 
was never achieved by Mr. Searles, nor anyone else that I 
can remember — the effect was to set a quota for 
performance and if there were stellar performances beyond 
that quota, for those sales that were beyond the quota 
amounts, the commission rate would double. But it 
wouldn't affect any commission rate for sales up to 
quota. 
Q. That's true. But nobody made quota, did they? 
A. I don't recall and I haven't analyzed that. 
There might have been someone who made quota. Quotas 
were different for various types of sales people. 
Q. That's true. But no area director made their 
quota, did they? 
A. Of the two, no. I don't believe either 
Mr. Zachery or Mr. Searles made quota. 
Q. Did Mr. Walls have a quota requirement in his 
employment agreement? 
A. He had no employment agreement. 
Q. He was working month to month. I don't know if 
you would call it month to month. It's working day to 
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Q. And what were your goals in obtaining a written 
agreement? 
A. To not have any misunderstandings with respect 
to the employment conditions. 
Q. To have a set term of employment? 
A. This agreement was from August 12 until the end 
of September, which was fiscal year '88 for Dayna. 
Q. I see. 
A. At that time I signed another agreement which 
was for one year beginning, basically, October 1st of 
'88. 
Q. But when you first came on as an employee of 
Dayna Communications, you didn't anticipate merely 
working for a six-week period, did you? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. Was there a discussion with Mr. Walls that he 
would have an employment agreement for a term longer than 
the expiration of their current fiscal year? 
A. Under this agreement or — 
Q. No. 
A. — the next agreement? 
Q. This agreement only lasted the six weeks? 
A. Six weeks; that's correct. 
Q. Was there a discussion with Mr. Walls that 
after this agreement ended there would be another written 
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agreement with a different term? 
A, Absolutely. 
Q. Okay. If I can show you Exhibit 2 — well, 
let's go back to Exhibit 1. The second page, paragraph 6 
is entitled Quota. On the third page it states that a 
quota signed to the A.D., which, I assume, is the area 
director, for the remainder of fiscal 1988 until 
September 30 of 1988 or $550,000 in sales. Was that 
achieved? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, it was not. 
Q. Was there any comment or complaint about your 
not having achieved that quota? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know what quota based on that was 
included in Exhibit 1-P? 
A. Quotas had to be assigned. Jim had a sales 
quota, per se, and that total sales quota had to be 
assigned to the various area directors, the international 
sales people, the telemarketing sales director, 
Bob Barrett. This was any portion of that total quota. 
Q. Did anybody meet their quota for the end of 
fiscal f88? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, no. The possible 
exception may have been John at international. 
Q. Domestically? 
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A- No. 
Q. Directing your attention to what has been 
marked Exhibit 2-P, is this the next agreement you signed 
for fiscal year '89? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Directing your attention to the third page 
again, paragraph 6, the quota provision, there are four 
quota requirements, the first six months1 quota totals 
two million four. First quarter, a million, second 
quarter is a million four. Were those numbers achieved? 
A. No, they were not. 
Q. Were there any reasons why those quotas weren't 
achieved? 
A. We all felt that the first quarter fiscal quota 
was going to be a Hail Mary, so to speak, pass until we 
started being able to ship new product, primarily Dayna 
Mail, Dayna Talk and Dayna Net. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So we had to rely on the old product, which was 
Dayna File, for the first quarter. 
Q. Was that the only product you had to sell in 
the first quarter of '89? 
A. That was the only product we had to sell that 
could be delivered. It was not the only product that we 
had to sell. 
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Q. Okay. Now, approximately how many units would 
have to have been moved to reach the million dollar mark 
in the first quarter? 
A. It would be an average of 2,000 units divided 
by an average of $550 per unit. My calculations — I 
don't have a calculator in front of me. 
Q. That was for just your part of the production; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there an understanding as to what 
percentage of the total company production you were going 
to be responsible for? 
MS. LEITH: Your Honor, I'll object to the 
extent that it's parol evidence, outside the term of the 
contract. 
MR. PERKINS: I think it's foundational and 
will ultimately go toward indicating whether or not good 
faith or good faith exercise of contracts or terms was 
affected by the defendant. 
THE COURT: And therefore not varying the term 
of the agreement? 
MR. PERKINS: Right. 
MS. LEITH: His question was what was the 
understanding of that percentage. If that does not go 
toward varying to or adding to the term of the contract, 
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then I have no objection if the evidence is admitted. 
THE COURT: Let me tell you, I think a more 
fair way to proceed here is since you represent the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff has a burden of proof, the 
plaintiff collects its claims and throws out other 
alternative claims, that if at any time you're offering a 
piece of evidence to vary the terms of the agreement, 
then you need to tell us. How is that? Then we don't 
have to worry about adding these objections. Is that a 
fair way to proceed? 
MR. PERKINS: Yes. I'll go with that. 
MS. LEITH: I think that would be very helpful. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Perkins) So do you recall if there was 
discussions as to how much of the company's total 
production you were going to be responsible for? 
A. Well, we had a total annual quota of $8.8 
million, as I recall. The sales objective for the 
company fiscal '89 was around $25 million. Just a little 
less than one-third of it. 
Q. Okay. Now, that would be consistent with three 
basic areas, or were there more than three basic areas: 
western United States, eastern and international? 
A. That's correct. There was a fourth area, which 
was the telemarketing, but to clarify one thing that Brad 
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termination, and I thought that was going to 
make an inquiry of the employer. Excuse 
MR. 
unemployment 
terminated? 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
PERKINS: The question was: 
intake worker inquire as to 
COURT: Inquire of him? 
PERKINS: Yes. 
me. 
did they 
Did the 
why 
COURT: What was your answer? 
he i «?as 
THE WITNESS: I was laid off. 
THE COURT: All right. The answer will stand. 
The objection is overruled. 
MS. LEITH: Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Perkins) Did your former employer ever 
contest that information? 
A. Not to my knowledge, no. 
Q. You didn't have a hearing before the 
unemployment department as to whether or not you had been 
terminated for cause and therefore not entitled to the 
same amount of unemployment benefits as if you had been 
laid off? 
A. No, thatfs correct. 
Q. Showing you what's been marked Exhibit 6, have 
you seen that document before? 
A. I have seen the document up through the January 
daily report. 
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1 becoming effective," 
2 And I think that the evidence clearly shows the 
3 corporation, Dayna Communications, had an obligation to 
4 provide additional funding, to provide additional head 
5 count to sell the product, and to in fact supply product 
5 to be sold on a timely basis to enable the sales crew to 
7 meet the quotas as set forth in the agreements. 
8 If they didn't do that, then they breached 
9 I their obligation which was implied, and I think it would 
10 be extremely unfair and unjust to hold the sales force to 
11 meeting quotas that were predicated on those 
12 considerations. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Motion is denied for 
14 the following reasons: The contract in question is clear 
25 and unambiguous. If it contains an integration clause 
26 and those are the preliminary determinations of the 
17 Court, the evidence that's been offered, which is the 
i8 premise of the motion to amend to conform with the 
29 evidence is such that these items that are called 
20 conditions do not rise to the level of the conditions. 
2i They were admitted specifically for the purpose 
22 of — well, for any purpose over and above amending the 
23 contract, and even if admitted for the purpose of 
24 amending the contract, they do not rise to the level of 
25 conditions precedent. 
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1 Honor. 
2 I'd like to point out that the contract at 
3 I issue, Exhibit 2, does not have any kind of notice 
4 requirement or any kind of procedure for termination. It 
5
 J just states grounds, and those grounds are called "for 
6 cause." 
7 And I would also like to point out that for 
8 J cause does not necessarily impose a guilt requirement or 
9 fault, as Mr. Perkins has suggested. The notice that has 
10 been introduced that Mr. Walls gave to Mr. Searles about 
11 his termination doesn't say anything about fault or guilt 
12 or cause. I think, contrary to the assertion that Dayna 
13 was acting in bad faith, Dayna was acting in good faith. 
14 Dayna cooperated with these people, Dayna did what it 
15 could to make the sales good, Dayna had an interest in 
16 seeing that Mr. Searles did well, because that was in 
17 Daynafs interest too. And Dayna was trying to be nice at 
18 the time of the termination, giving Mr. Searles more 
19 money than he was actually entitled to under the 
20 contract. And I think that negates any doubt that there 
2i might be about good faith execution of the contract. 
22 THE COURT: In consideration of the motion, the 
23 Court construes the evidence in a light most favorable to 
24 the plaintiff, Mr. Searles. And as an additional point, 
25 I should indicate that in one of my previous rulings on 
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1 either a motion for a protective order by the defendant 
2 or motion to compel by the plaintiff, I ordered that 
3 information concerning other employees be produced so 
4 that Mr. Searles would have the opportunity to put on 
5 evidence that his termination was pretextual. No such 
6 evidence came before me today. 
7 With those prefatory matters in mind, I'm going 
S to grant the motion for the following reasons: 
9 Count 1, the literal contract claim. There's 
10 been a failure to produce any evidence that the defendant 
11 violated any terms and conditions of the contract in 
12 terminating the defendant. Defendant, according to the 
13 evidence, construed in a light most favorable for the 
14 plaintiff, was terminated for cause. Cause is defined by 
15 the contract, not by any moral considerations or anything 
16 like that. Cause in this particular contract is 
17 established, in part, by failure to meet quotas. 
18 The evidence unequivocally indicates that the 
19 defendant concedes that the quotas were not met. 
20 Therefore, the contract provision on cause could be 
2i invoked, it was invoked, and the termination was had, and 
22 the termination does not constitute a violation of the 
23 contract. 
24 As to the second count, good faith and fair 
25 dealing, there is no evidence before the Court that there 
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1 was any unfair dealing or that there was any bad faith by 
2 the defendant. The evidence does not establish any 
3 requirement of the defendant to provide product, per se. 
4 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, 
5 would prohibit the defendant from failing to provide 
6 product in bad faith. There is no evidence to suggest 
7 that there was bad faith in doing so. 
8 There is, however, evidence that would 
9 suggest — and not to credit it or discredit it, all I'm 
10 saying is there's been a failure of evidence. But there 
11 is evidence to suggest that the failure of providing 
12 product was somewhat natural to this industry in the 
13 sense that that occurs from time to time and that hope 
14 springs eternal, evidently, in this industry, and 
25 frequently prognostications are not met. 
16 The conduct generating the failure to provide 
17 product and necessarily the inability of the plaintiff, 
18 through no fault of his, to meet the quotas was due to 
19 inaccurate projections. 
20 Now, it would be one thing if these quotas were 
2i set after the signing of the contract or that something 
22 occurred thereafter by the defendant and affirmatively 
23 and in bad faith or unfair interfering with defendant to 
24 meet his quotas. There is no evidence of that in this 
25 case. 
142 
1 What this case is really about is what are 
2 contracts about? Without construing the motivation 
3 behind the for cause provision premised on quotas in the 
4 contract, it could well have been that that provision is 
5 in there because the industry tends to overestimate the 
6 market capacity or the ability of research and 
7 development to place the product on the market at or 
8 before the time anticipated. 
9 The real difficulty in this case is not a 
iO breach of contract or breach of good faith and fair 
U dealing. The remedy is to not enter into contracts that 
12 will allow the defendant to terminate for failure to meet 
13 quotas when the product is not available. Such provision 
14 is not in this contract and, thus, that remedy is 
25 unavailable. The contract itself, there's been no 
16 evidence that it's a contract of adhesion, that it's 
17 immoral, unlawful or anything else. And, therefore, the 
18 contract is not a guarantee of employment. It's a 
j9 guarantee of employment only if all conditions from the 
20 employee's side are met, where they were not met in this 
2i case, through no fault of the plaintiff, but that's not a 
22 basis upon which to find a breach of contract or breach 
23 of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
24 For the reason stated, the motion under Rule 
25 50, is granted and there is still pending before me a 
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1 motion to dismiss, which is, therefore, mooted by my 
l ruling now. A motion under Rule 50 is not one which 
3 requires findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
4 because, in effect, my obligation as a finder of fact is 
5 never invoked until the prima facie case is established. 
6 I have determined that no prima facie case has 
7 been established and, thus, not a finding for findings of 
8 fact and conclusions of law. There is, however, an 
9 obligation that the ruling of the Court, when there were 
10 multiple grounds for it, must be set forth in writing. I 
11 believe that's stated in Rule 52. So, Ms. Leith, you 
12 need to prepare an order or judgment consistent with the 
23 Court's ruling here. And I believe under the rule I was 
14 referring to — that's not right. If there's a 
25 requirement to have more than just a judgment for the 
16 defendant, then you'll find it in Rule 52, and you should 
17 adhere to that if there's such an obligation, and submit 
18 to me the judgment in accordance with Rule 504. 
29 MS. LEITH: Your Honor, are you looking for the 
20 provision that you referred to? 
2i THE COURT: Mo. I'm trying to make up my mind 
22 on taxable costs. Well, I'm not going to say anything 
23 about costs here. I'll tell you why. If I say nothing 
24 then it's still open, even though the presumption is that 
25 the taxable costs are awarded to the prevailing party. 
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